Per un ripensamento della fenomenologia

La dimensione inconscia della soggettività da Husserl a Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

The aim of this work is to demonstrate how the unconscious, in Husserlian phenomenology, should be understood as an operative concept. In light of this, the consequences for what is meant by the “I” will be examined, as well as the substantial differences from a definition of transcendental subjectivity. Secondly, emphasis will be placed on constituting life as unconscious and, above all, as a natural dimension of subjectivity. To support this, it is necessary to stress how the naïve attitude hinders its understanding. The intention is then to link these results to a reconsideration of the naturality of phenomenology, drawing on the work of Merleau-Ponty. The latter will be of great importance, as he highlights how corporeality is essentially entangled in a world. In this regard, this reversible conjunction and co-implication of body and world will be reconsidered in light of the concept of anonymity proposed by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception and in his last works.